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While the Paris Agreement (PA) has enshrined ambitious long-term objectives, the 
current level of action of the Parties to the Agreement falls far short of this ambition, 
as is recognised in the very COP decision adopting the Agreement. The Global 
Stocktake (GST) established in Art. 14 of the PA is a key element to address this 
problem. Its purpose is to review the implementation of the PA and to assess the 
progress made towards the collectively agreed goals.  
The aim of this report is to develop recommendations on how to maximise the 
potential impact of the GST. The report starts from a perspective of what the GST 
could ideally do, irrespective of decisions already taken under the UNFCCC and other 
political constraints. In the second step, the report takes these limitations into 
account and suggests ways for how to nonetheless work towards the desired 
outcome. 
The discussion is mostly structured according to the three thematic areas which the 
official GST is mandated to address: mitigation, adaptation and means of 
implementation and support. According to the modalities adopted in Katowice, the 
GST may also take into account efforts to address the social and economic 
consequences and impacts of response measures and efforts to avert, minimize and 
address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. In 
addition, the GST has been opened to include information on all financial flows, not 
just means of implementation and support. In this paper, the issue of financial flows 
has been aggregated with the issue of means of implementation and support, while 
questions of impacts of response measures are integrated in the mitigation 
sections. More research will be needed to also address questions of loss and 
damage. In addition, the Katowice decision characterized equity as “cross-cutting” 
and decided to consider it “throughout the GST”. Equity will hence be reflected for all 
issues addressed in this report. 
The report first discusses in general terms how the UNFCCC regime may catalyse 
enhanced efforts on climate protection. As decisions are ultimately taken nationally, 
the role the international climate process can play is to serve as a key catalyst for 
these national discussions by keeping the issue on the agenda and forcing national 
policy makers to continuously revisit it.  
Building on previous work (Hermwille et al., 2019; Jeffery et al., 2019), the report 
subsequently proposes three specific functions by which the GST in particular may 
foster enhanced action: 
• The GST may provide guidance and signal by further specifying the objectives 
laid down in the Paris Agreement. On mitigation, the long-term emission 
target could be broken down to the sector level and the GST could discuss 
roadmaps for sectoral decarbonisation. On adaptation, the GST could 
+ Executive Summary 
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highlight that substantial climate impacts are already happening, that they are 
going to get far worse, and that the current adaptation response is 
inadequate. Such a signal could also help underscore the need to step up on 
mitigation. On finance, the GST could develop guidance on what making all 
finance flows consistent with the Paris Objectives could mean and how to 
achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation finance. If agreeing 
guidance is not possible politically, the GST could at least foster a 
convergence of views by promoting discussions on the issue. 
• The GST may contribute to providing transparency and accountability. This 
function could be performed best if the GST were able to assess the 
performance of individual Parties. However, the mandate of the GST is to 
assess only collective progress. This limitation may be overcome to some 
extent by assessing groups of countries. For example, Parties could be 
grouped into tiers according to indicators of responsibility and capability such 
as current and historic per capita emissions or GDP. In addition, the overall 
GST process may serve as ‘echo chamber’ for broader discussions on the 
efforts of individual Parties. 
• The GST may foster knowledge and learning on how to effectively achieve the 
objectives of the Paris Agreement. 
 
On the basis of the discussion which functions the GST could perform, the report 
discusses which process- and information-related conditions need to be put in place 
to implement these functions and assesses how these conditions are reflected in 
S.M.A.R.T. Guidance in Climate Governance 
The principles and objectives of an agreement may provide orientation to 
Parties to the agreement and other relevant actors as to the course of action 
that is desired. The Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC in general contain a 
number of objectives for mitigation, adaptation and finance. However, these 
objectives are arguably too broad and general to provide clear guidance. 
Management studies have developed the concept of defining objectives in a 
S.M.A.R.T. way. According to this concept, objectives should be 
• Specific - Target a specific area for improvement; 
• Measurable - Quantify or suggest an indicator of progress; 
• Assignable - Specify who will do it; 
• Realistic - State what results can realistically be achieved, given 
available resources; 
• Time-bound - Specify when the result(s) can be achieved (Doran, 
1981). 
The report discusses what guidance and signal the Paris Agreement is 
currently providing for mitigation, adaptation and finance, and how they could 
be further developed in a more “S.M.A.R.T.” way. 
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the modalities of the GST as adopted in Katowice. Essentially, to be effective, the 
GST needs to be conceived as a process, not an isolated event, and this process 
needs to meet certain conditions: 
• The process needs to be inclusive, facilitating participation by a broad range 
of stakeholders, in particular from developing countries. Facilitating 
participation should include not only participation at GST events, but also 
support for active engagement, such as providing written inputs to the GST. 
• Information provided by Parties and complemented with other inputs needs 
to enable benchmark setting for climate action, to allow for transparent 
assessments of the state of progress, and to be politically relevant and 
concrete enough to trigger enhancement of action. 
• The process needs to be scheduled in a timely manner, so that the 
informational input is ready when needed and the political output comes in 
time to be most effective. 
• The process needs to give stakeholders opportunities to comment on and 
complement the information provided by Parties as this information may be 
incomplete or biased. 
• Complementarily, the GST requires a facilitative format in which good 
practice can be shared, highlighted and processed into relevant 
recommendations. Ideally, this would take the form of structured dialogues of 
experts focusing on concrete challenges for adaptation, mitigation and 
finance and how to overcome them. 
• Outputs should include high-level political messages on the need to enhance 
efforts as well as a detailed technical summary of available options, best 
practice, and recommendations. The final output should be a CMA decision 
fully endorsing the results of the GST and urging Parties to take them fully into 
account in the revision of their NDCs. 
• Finally, the GST needs to feature a high-level political event in order to 
amplify the messages towards influencing national policy agendas and as a 
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+ 1. Introduction 
 
While the Paris Agreement (PA) has enshrined ambitious long-term objectives, the current 
level of action of the Parties to the Agreement falls far short of this ambition, as is 
recognised in the very COP decision adopting the Agreement.  
The Global Stocktake (GST) established in Art. 14 of the PA is a key element to address this 
problem. Its purpose is to review the implementation of the PA and to “assess the collective 
progress” towards the collectively agreed goals (UNFCCC, 2016b, Art. 14.1). Parties are to 
take the outcomes of the GST into account when updating and revising their nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs). The GST thereby establishes a feedback mechanism 
connecting the short-term climate action contained in the NDCs with the overall long-term 
targets of the PA (Northrop et al., 2018).  
The GST is thereby the primary explicit institutional feature of the PA that is supposed to 
catalyse dynamic increases in the level of ambition over time (Müller & Ngwadla, 2016; van 
Asselt, 2016). While other drivers of ambition exist, e.g. the ever increasing engagement of 
non-state and subnational actors (Chan et al., 2019) and rapid cost decline of some key 
mitigation technologies, in particular wind and solar energy and battery technology, the GST 
is supposed to take up this momentum and galvanize national governments into more 
ambitious climate action.   
With the adoption of the modalities of the GST as part of the Paris Agreement “Rulebook” at 
the 24th Conference of the Parties (COP24) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Katowice in 2018, the foundations for the first GST in 2023 
have been laid. However, the provisions are not very detailed and allow for ample flexibility 
for the negotiation Chairs and Facilitators, as well as the UNFCCC Secretariat, to set it up in 
a way that maximizes the catalytic effect of the GST (Obergassel et al., 2019).  
The aim of this report is to develop recommendations on how to maximise the potential 
impact of the GST. The report starts from a perspective of what the GST could ideally do, 
irrespective of decisions already taken under the UNFCCC and other political constraints. In 
the second step, the report takes these limitations into account and suggests ways for how 
to nonetheless work towards the desired outcome. 
The report builds on previous work (Hermwille et al., 2019; Jeffery et al., 2019). Section 2 
first discusses in general terms how the UNFCCC regime may catalyse enhanced efforts on 
climate protection. Section 3 proposes three specific functions by which the GST in 
particular may foster enhanced action. This discussion is mostly structured according to the 
three thematic areas which the official GST is mandated to address: mitigation, adaptation 
and means of implementation and support. According to the modalities adopted in 
Katowice, the GST may also take into account efforts to address the social and economic 
consequences and impacts of response measures and efforts to avert, minimize and 
address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. In 
addition, the GST has been opened to include information on all financial flows, not just 
means of implementation and support. In this paper, the issue of financial flows has been 
aggregated with the issue of means of implementation and support, while questions of 
impacts of response measures are integrated in the mitigation sections. More research will 
be needed to also address questions of loss and damage. In addition, the Katowice decision 
characterized equity as “cross-cutting” and decided to consider it “throughout the GST”. 
Equity will hence be reflected for all issues addressed in this report. 
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On this basis, section 4 discusses which information- and process-related conditions need 
to be put in place to implement the functions of the GST and assesses how these conditions 
are reflected in the modalities of the GST as adopted in Katowice. Section 5 concludes. 
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+ 2. The Climate Regime as Pacemaker 
of National Discussions 
 
The UNFCCC process is frequently criticised for failing to deliver on what is needed to 
prevent dangerous climate change. However, it bears noting that at the end of the day the 
United Nations are a negotiating platform of sovereign states, not a centralized world 
government. Negotiators always have to refer back to their national capitals before making 
any concessions on their positions. International conferences can therefore only rarely take 
decisions that have not previously been prepared nationally.  
And the current situation is that most key countries are still locked into high-emission 
pathways, economically and institutionally. For example, energy provision and transport are 
dominated by strong incumbent industries whose business models rely on using fossil fuels, 
and combating climate change basically requires to end these business models (Rayner et 
al., 2018).  
Changes in national politics and policies will therefore to a large extent be a prerequisite for, 
rather than a consequence of, the development of effective international climate policy. The 
role the international climate process can in the meantime play is to serve as a key catalyst 
for these national discussions by keeping the issue on the agenda and forcing national 
policy makers to continuously revisit it. 
And there is evidence that the UNFCCC process does indeed fulfil this catalytic function. 
While Copenhagen failed to deliver the anticipated climate treaty, the summit was not 
without successes if seen in a broader context. The deadline imposed by the Copenhagen 
conference injected a significant momentum into national discussions as all countries were 
forced to make up their minds what their contribution to the agreement was going to be. Up 
till rather shortly before the conference there was little reason to expect that countries like 
China and India would submit emission targets, but ultimately they did (Sterk, Arens, 
Kreibich, Mersmann, & Wehnert, 2012). Subsequently, the momentum generated by the 
Copenhagen process resulted in a substantial increase in national climate legislation 
(Dubash, Hagemann, Höhne, & Upadhyaya, 2013). And there is evidence that the Paris 
process is having the same result. The preparation of NDCs has resulted in impacts such as 
initiating long term planning processes, advancing climate change on political agendas, and 
developing in-country technical capacities (Day, Röser, Tewari, Kurdziel, & Höhne, 2015). 
The ‘ambition cycle’ established by the Paris Agreement institutionalises this catalytic 
function. The 5-yearly cycle of NDC updates, assessment and review of national action and 
support, as well as the aggregate assessment of implementation in the form of periodic 
GSTs create a “pacemaker” that helps to stimulate and synchronize climate national policy 
processes. National policy makers will now have to regularly account for how they are 
contributing to combating climate change and what they could do to strengthen their 
contributions (Obergassel et al., 2016).  
Essentially, the NDC cycle resembles a prototypical policy cycle (see Figure 1). In this cycle, 
the GST bridges the evaluation stage and the agenda setting stage for subsequent NDC 
cycles. It aggregates the individual Party-level evaluations in order to derive conclusions at 
the global level. These conclusions are then supposed to inform the respective national 
climate policy agendas for the next round of NDCs (Hermwille et al., 2019). 
Success Factors for the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement December 2019 
iGST Designing a Robust Stocktake Discussion Series 11 
 
 
Figure 1: The NDC Cycle as a policy cycle. Source: Hermwille et al., 2019. 
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+ 3. Potential Functions of the Global 
Stocktake 
 
3.1. Functions of International Governance 
How may the design of the GST best maximise its potential for catalysing national 
discussions? International relations studies have conceptualised the potential contribution 
international governance can make to solving problems such as climate change in the form 
of governance functions. Oberthür et al. (2017) identify five functions international 
governance institutions may perform in general to promote climate transition: 
• Guidance & Signal: International institutions can signal the resolve of members to 
pursue a certain course of action such as decarbonisation. These signals derive from 
the principles and objectives on which inter- and transnational institutions are based 
and can provide direction beyond the respective international institution. For 
example, the objectives laid down in the Paris Agreement have been found to entail 
strong guidance as they signal the resolve of governments across the world to take 
far-reaching action on climate change. 
• Rules & Standards: In addition to signalling the desired direction of travel, 
international institutions can also require certain actions from countries in order to 
achieve the objectives commonly agreed on. Rules may include common/reciprocal 
obligations of result, such as emission targets, and standards of behaviour 
(obligations of conduct) such as prohibition or prescription of certain behaviour, 
harmonisation of (technical) standards or provision of incentives. 
• Transparency & Accountability: International institutions may enhance the 
transparency of the actions taken by their members by collecting and analysing 
relevant data, and identifying and addressing problems in implementation of agreed 
rules/standards. 
• Means of Implementation: International institutions may organise the provision of 
capacity building, technology transfer, and financial resources among members, 
including coordination efforts for effective allocation.  
• Knowledge & Learning: International institutions may create knowledge as well as 
platforms for individual and social learning. The aim is creation and diffusion of 
scientific, economic, technical and policy-related knowledge on the understanding of 
and/or possible solutions to the problem at hand.  
Setting rules and providing means of implementation is addressed by other elements of the 
Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC more broadly. What the GST may do is to contribute to 
the guidance, transparency and learning functions (for a somewhat different approach to 
potential functions of the GST, see Hermwille et al., 2019). In effect, these three functions 
where essentially captured by the three questions that were at the core of the Talanoa 
Dialogue: 
• “Where are we now” relates to the status quo, which can be captured by the 
transparency provisions of the regime. 
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• “Where do we need to go” relates to the guidance and signal function. 
• “How do we get there” is a question of knowledge and learning about how to achieve 
the desired end. 
The following will discuss each of these functions in turn. As per the three thematic streams 
of the GST, for each function mitigation, adaptation and finance will be discussed 
separately. 
3.2. Guidance and Signal – Where Do We Need to Go? 
3.2.1. General Considerations 
The principles and objectives of an agreement may provide orientation to Parties to the 
agreement and other relevant actors as to the course of action that is desired. The Paris 
Agreement and the UNFCCC in general contain a number of objectives for mitigation, 
adaptation and finance. However, these objectives are arguably too broad and general to 
provide clear guidance. Management studies have developed the concept of defining 
objectives in a S.M.A.R.T. way. According to this concept, objectives should be 
• Specific - Target a specific area for improvement; 
• Measurable - Quantify or suggest an indicator of progress; 
• Assignable - Specify who will do it; 
• Realistic - State what results can realistically be achieved, given available resources; 
• Time-bound - Specify when the result(s) can be achieved (Doran, 1981). 
The following sections discuss what guidance and signal the Paris Agreement is currently 
providing for mitigation, adaptation and finance, and how they could be improved. 
3.2.2. Guidance and Signal for Mitigation 
Current high-emission practices are often deeply embedded in societal paradigms. 
Transformational change therefore requires a fundamental ‘mindshift’ (Göpel, 2016; also see 
Milkoreit, 2017). Change occurs when new collective ideas emerge associated with shifting 
cultural values and world views that guide everyday decision making (see Geels & Schot, 
2010).  
For example, in traditional transport paradigms, extending transport infrastructure has been 
seen critical as a foundation for economic development. Moreover, increasing mobility by 
means of individual vehicles has been associated with increasing wealth and hence 
increases of transport volumes have been viewed positively – notwithstanding the 
associated GHG emissions and other social costs (Sims et al., 2014). Another practice is 
priority provision of urban space for automobile-friendly infrastructure, such as parking 
spaces and road capacities, while more sustainable transport modes are often given low 
priority in urban planning (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2013).  
The GST can foster change by institutionalizing a global vision of a decarbonized and 
sustainable future. Through periodic goal setting and benchmarking, the GST may contribute 
to normalization of ambitious climate action and shift expectations of stakeholders across 
all governance levels (Hale, 2018). 
The guidance and signal provided by the PA for mitigation so far mainly derives from its 
purpose as laid down in Art. 2 and in particular the long-term temperature goal established in 
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Art. 2.1(a). This temperature goal is further operationalized by the goal to achieve 
greenhouse gas neutrality in the second half of the century (Art. 4.1). Together they provide 
a top-level, collectively agreed vision for the global transformation.  
Based on the ‘S.M.A.R.T. objectives’ concept, the mitigation objectives of the Paris 
Agreement are a substantial improvement compared to the ultimate objective of the 
Convention, which “is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” While this 
objective is on the one hand very ambitious, it did not specify what would be a “dangerous 
anthropogenic interference”, nor at what level GHG concentrations should be stabilised. The 
objectives of the Paris Agreement are more specific, measurable and time-bound. They have 
thereby contributed to the emergence of a view that a large share of available fossil fuel 
reserves should not be exploited (Rayner et al., 2018). 
However, all five dimensions of the S.M.A.R.T. metric could still be further improved. With 
the net-zero objective, it is not clear which sectors will be required to reduce emissions to 
zero (or below zero) and which sectors may be allowed to continue having a certain amount 
of emissions. In addition, for many sectors, a great deal of ambiguity remains on what 
reducing to zero would mean. While the challenges are largely known for the electricity 
sector and the electrification of passenger transport, decarbonisation pathways are not yet 
clear, for example, on emission intensive industries, agriculture and land-use including 
forestry (IPCC, 2018; Kuramochi et al., 2018).  
Against this background, what could be the role of the GST? First of all, the GST is an 
opportunity to reiterate and reinforce the signal already provided in Paris. Based on 
assessment of the current status and trajectories (see section on transparency and 
accountability below), the GST should highlight that the global mitigation response is still far 
from what would be needed to achieve the Paris objectives.  
However, quantifying the ‘emissions gap’ and exhorting a sense of urgency would not be a 
novel contribution. A main added value of the GST could be to further develop and refine the 
existing signal. In particular, the GST could break the answers to the Talanoa Dialogue’s 
question of “where do we want to go?” down to the level of the individual sectors. For 
example, the GST could collate and institutionalize sectoral decarbonisation visions that 
spell out what each sector would need to look like to be compatible with the Paris 
temperature limit. It could assess and/or endorse sectoral visions (e.g. developed by 
sectoral transnational governance initiatives) and assess barriers and drivers towards the 
realization of these visions (Rayner et al., 2018).  
In line with the mandate to address social and economic consequences and impacts of 
response measures, such a development of sectoral decarbonisation visions should ensure 
consistency with other international Agendas like the SDGs and the New Urban Agenda. On 
the one hand, climate policy needs to avoid pursuing activities that have negative impacts on 
other sustainability aspects. The ‘yellow vest crisis’ in France illustrated how ill-conceived 
climate policies that impose costs on disadvantaged parts of society may engender strong 
political resistance (Ganglebin, Graichen, & Lenck, 2019). On the other hand, many mitigation 
options also have positive impacts on other sustainability concerns such as air pollution. 
Highlighting such potential synergies would be helpful to ensure that the GST’s outputs 
resonate with the national discourse of as many countries as possible. Climate protection is 
at best one factor in national political discussions, the main concern is usually economic 
and societal well-being. While non-climate benefits of climate actions, such as job creation 
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of reduced local air pollution, are often classified as ‘co-benefits’ in climate policy circles, in 
national policy discussions they are usually seen as the main benefits and emission 
reductions as a co-benefit. Parties may therefore be motivated much more by positive 
development potentials and synergetic opportunities than by yet another call for urgency 
(also see Hale, 2018). The issue of the impacts of response measures was initially 
introduced to highlight socio-economic costs of mitigation actions. However, if a full 
accounting of all costs and benefits is undertaken, the impacts agenda may actually serve 
as a driver of a ambition, highlighting how mitigation actions may yield multiple benefits and 
how costs can be avoided or at least minimised.  
To comply with the mandate of addressing impacts of response measures, sectoral 
decarbonisation visions could therefore aim to maximise benefits for other aspects of 
sustainability and avoid trade-offs as much as possible. The GST could elaborate on and 
highlight which mitigation opportunities yield socio-economic benefits and which ones entail 
socio-economic costs and should therefore be avoided. In this context the GST could also 
assess and highlight how technological, financial, and policy innovations have reduced the 
costs of mitigation options and thereby expanded socially beneficial opportunities since 
Parties adopted their last NDCs (Constantino, Wubet, & Herz, 2018). 
Again, the signal value could probably be maximised if the sectoral decarbonisation visions 
contained ‘S.M.A.R.T’ objectives and indicators. These could for example include targets for 
when the individual sectors should achieve (net) zero emissions as well as sustainability in 
the broad sense, such as targets for reducing air pollution or traffic deaths. 
Refining the signal provided from the PA would not only help guide the next round of NDCs, 
but could also serve as an updated reference point for all kinds of initiatives (including non-
state and subnational actors). It would provide legitimation and orientation for transnational 
governance initiatives and thus help ‘orchestrate’ the groundswell of climate action (Hale & 
Roger, 2014). The PA was able to raise global recognition and awareness of climate change 
throughout all layers of society. By further specifying what achieving the PA’s objectives 
would mean, the ideal GST could channel this attention to the challenges that need to be 
overcome on the ground (Hermwille et al., 2019). 
From an equity perspective, an ideal GST would also provide guidance on what level of effort 
individual countries should make. However, this runs counter to the GST’s mandate to 
address only collective efforts. Also more generally, efforts to calculate ‘fair shares’ have so 
far gained little traction politically. The first GST will therefore probably need to start with the 
bottom-up approach that underpins the Paris Agreement. Parties were requested to explain 
why the considered their NDCs to be a fair contribution to the global effort. The GST could 
summarise these explanations and try to work towards a commonly applicable approach to 
justifying the fairness of contributions. To be in a better position for future stocktakes, 
Parties could also mandate the SBSTA to develop a consistent framework or set of 
indicators that could be used to assess the adequacy of efforts and equity. The limitation of 
the mandate to address only collective progress may be overcome by assessing groups of 
countries (Northrop et al., 2018). For example, Parties could be grouped into tiers according 
to indicators of responsibility and capability such as current and historic per capita 
emissions or GDP. 
3.2.3. Guidance and Signal for Adaptation 
The signal sent by the PA on adaptation is very generic. The related objective in Article 2.1 
(b) is “Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster 
climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does 
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not threaten food production”. In addition, Article 7.1 establishes “the global goal on 
adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing 
vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and 
ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal referred to 
in Article 2”. Hence, essentially, the adaptation goal of the PA is to adapt to climate change. 
This objective is neither very specific, nor measurable, nor assignable, nor time-bound.  
The GST could therefore endeavour to develop more specific guidance on what an adequate 
adaptation response would look like. This guidance could potentially be differentiated 
according to what impacts could be expected in a a 3-4°C and 1.5°/2 world. On this basis, 
the GST could determine the ‘adaptation gap’, i.e. to what extent current adaptation plans, 
policies and support (financial and technical) provided are ‘adequate’ and ‘effective’ to 
respond to needs. However, setting “S.M.A.R.T” global goals for adaptation is difficult as 
needs and related progress are very context-specific, depending on what the impacts and 
vulnerabilities are at local level.  
The main signal on adaptation could therefore be to highlight that substantial climate 
impacts are already happening, that they are going to get far worse, and that the current 
adaptation response is inadequate (IPCC, 2014a, 2018; UNEP, 2014, 2017). The lack of 
action on adaptation is still not as much on the public radar as the lack of action on 
mitigation. In this way, the GST could help to force governments to keep climate change 
impacts and adaptation on their national agendas as well as encouraging (developed 
country) governments to increase financial support for adaptation to the developing world.  
Signalling the severity of prospective climate impacts would also help reinforce the signal on 
the urgency of mitigation action. As the PA recognises in Article 7.4, greater levels of 
mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and greater adaptation 
needs can involve greater adaptation costs.  
From an equity perspective, it is highly unjust that those who are least responsible for 
causing climate change are the most vulnerable to its impacts. The Convention in Article 4 
therefore requires developed countries to provide support for adaptation efforts by 
developing countries, effectively calling for an equitable sharing of the adaptation burden. 
The GST could undertake to develop a shared understanding of what an equitable response 
to the inequitably distributed impacts could look like. If such a shared understanding was 
developed, this could lead to adaptation being treated as a global challenge (Winkler, 2019). 
Such a shared understanding should also take into account intranational equity, focussing 
support on groups that are most vulnerable. 
3.2.4. Guidance and Signal for Finance 
On finance, the guidance and signal provided by the PA so far relate to financial flows in 
general and to the provision of financial resources for mitigation and adaptation in 
particular.  
• Article 2.1(c) establishes the objective to make all finance flows “consistent with a 
pathway towards low-greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development”. 
• Article 9.1 reiterates the obligation of developed countries to provide financial 
resources to developing countries. In addition, Article 9.2 encourages other Parties to 
provide such support voluntarily. Article 9.4 reiterates earlier calls that provision of 
financial resources “should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and 
mitigation”. 
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There is some evidence that Article 2.1(c) has already contributed to initiating a paradigm 
shift in the financial industry (Chenet, Zamarioli, Kretschmer, & Narvaez, 2019). Nonetheless, 
as with mitigation, the Paris objectives for finance are arguably too broad and general to 
provide clear guidance. In particular, there is so far no definition of what being “consistent 
with a pathway towards low-greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development” 
would mean. The objective is therefore fairly unspecific, not measurable, not assignable and 
not time-bound and hence hardly actionable in its current form. Ideally, the GST process 
would elaborate guidance on what ‘consistency’ means. For mitigation, such guidance could 
build on the sectoral decarbonisation visions discussed above. If there was a shared vision 
that decarbonising sector A would means promoting x, y, z and phasing out a, b, c, this 
would provide guidance to governments and financial actors on where to direct investments. 
Similarly for adaptation, if there was a shared understanding on what an adequate and 
equitable adaptation response to climate change should look like, this could serve as 
guidance for finance. 
Based on such guidance, the GST could signal the urgency of the need to redirect financial 
flows by highlighting to what extent they are currently not consistent with the objectives of 
the Agreement. It can further signal what consistency might entail, without being 
prescriptive, for example, highlighting progressive countries with respect to broad areas 
such as financial policy and regulation (e.g. climate stress testing and disclosure), fiscal 
policies (e.g. fossil fuel subsidy reform and resilience levies) and public finance (e.g. public 
procurement and finance spent through development finance institutions) (Watson & 
Roberts, 2019). This aspect will be further pursued in the section on transparency.  
In addition, part of the challenge in redirecting financial flows is a lack of information about 
climate-related financial risks. If markets were informed better about climate-related risks, 
this would contribute to shifting investments. The GST could contribute to this process by 
signalling the impacts climate change itself is going to have on investments, as well as the 
potential impacts of mitigation policies, such as the potential need for early retirement of 
assets such as unabated coal power plants (Chenet et al., 2019).  
On the provision of financial resources, a ‘S.M.A.R.T’ benchmark was established at COP15 
in Copenhagen. There, developed countries pledged to jointly mobilise USD 100 billion a year 
by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. In addition, the decision adopting the 
Paris Agreement establishes that developed countries intend to continue this mobilisation 
goal through 2025, and that “prior to 2025 the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall set a new collective quantified goal from 
a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing 
countries” (UNFCCC, 2016a, p. para 53). 
The GST could signal at what level the next collective goal should be set in terms of 
effectiveness and equity. The Convention in Article 4.3 explicitly recognizes “the need for 
adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds”. The GST could provide guidance on what 
adequate provision of finance should mean by taking stock of priorities and support needs 
of developing countries. On this basis, the GST could quantify the ‘finance gap’ between 
climate finance that is being mobilized and the finance that would need to be mobilized to 
achieve the PA’s objectives in an equitable manner. Again, such a needs assessment could 
build on guidance for sectoral decarbonisation pathways and adequacy of adaptation as 
discussed above. It would potentially be useful to differentiate the ‘finance gap’ for 
adaptation and mitigation. 
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On this basis, the GST could develop guidance for achieving a balance between adaptation 
and mitigation finance. Similar to the goal of achieving overall consistency of financial flows 
with the Paris objectives, the ‘balance’ goal remains to be defined. Through the transparency 
function, the GST could further develop and refine the existing signals by going into more 
detail on finance received by those particularly vulnerable to climate change including the 
least developed countries and small island states. It could further detail the sectors 
receiving much of this finance and by process, the sectors that are receiving less, thereby 
signalling where provision of finance should be increased.  
From the equity perspective, the GST could also develop guidance on what equitable effort 
sharing in the provision of finance should look like. Article 4.3 of the UNFCCC commits 
developed countries to providing finance and explicitly recognizes “the importance of 
appropriate burden sharing among the developed country Parties” with regards to the 
provision of climate finance (UNFCCC, 1992).  
Finally, the GST could develop guidance for the mobilisation aspect of the collective finance 
goal. The goal refers not only to public finance but also to private finance mobilized by 
public interventions. The question is, for example, whether private finance that is mobilized 
in developing countries by interventions of developed countries should be counted towards 
developed countries’ fulfilment of the collective finance goal or towards the host countries’ 
efforts to implement its NDC, or both. Another example is whether it is appropriate for 
developed country private enterprises, enabled by their governments’ intervention, to invest 
in adaptation efforts in developing countries, charge user fees, and count this arrangement, 
which is ultimately funded by the fee-payers of the developing country, toward the collective 
finance goal (Holz, Athanasiou, & Kartha, 2019). 
3.3. Transparency and Accountability – Where Are We Now? 
3.3.1. General Considerations 
Climate change has been characterised as a collective action problem (IPCC, 2014b). In this 
context, a rationalist theory of (transformative) change is often assumed, according to which 
change is typically understood to be incremental and market-driven. Prices (whether they are 
monetary, political, or any other kind) are the drivers of change. In this regard, one of the key 
criticisms of the PA is its lack of legal compulsion (Depledge, 2016; Rajamani, 2016) which 
limits the ability to impose costs on non-compliant governments. To some extent, legal 
obligation has been substituted by a focus on transparency in the hope that a threat of 
‘naming and shaming’ can discipline policy makers to adequately implement their NDCs 
(Obergassel et al., 2015, 2016; Oberthür & Bodle, 2016; Bodansky, 2016). But what is required 
in order to make naming and shaming effective and what can the GST contribute to this 
end? 
For the ‘naming’ part a key requirement is transparency. Without accurate and sufficiently 
granular data it remains impossible to determine whether, and to what extent, countries have 
achieved their pledges. For the ‘shaming’ part, a high level of public attention is required. The 
transparency framework will most likely not be sufficient in this regard. It is unlikely that the 
technical expert reviews, i.e. independent reviews of a Party’s reporting by a team of 
international experts, will receive a lot of public attention unless they are somehow 
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highlighted at an international event.1 Also, the review reports may not be written in a format 
easily accessible to the media and wider public (Hermwille et al., 2019).  
This is where the ideal GST could make a contribution: by publicly receiving, reviewing and 
appraising individual country reports in a format amenable for a wider public. However, the 
GST has a very narrow mandate (if at all) in this regard: Art. 14.1 postulates that the GST is 
supposed to assess collective progress only. Hence, Milkoreit and Haapala (2017) argue that 
there is no scope for ‘naming and shaming’ within the GST. However, while individual 
countries will not be put into the spotlight in the official process, the GST could still create an 
echo chamber for the transparency framework that helps to attract the necessary public 
attention. If collective progress is on the political agenda at the global level, the natural next 
question at the national level would be to ask what each country contributed to the status 
quo (for a detailed discussion of pathways towards accountability see Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 
et al., 2018). While the official GST does not have the mandate to assess the performance of 
individual countries, it could help create framework conditions that could allow other actors 
to do so. For example, pro-compliance actors at national level could use the data from the 
transparency framework and the public attention generated by the GST process to challenge 
their governments for their lack of action.  
Taking another approach, Milkoreit and Haapala (2017, p. 9) highlight that enhancing 
ambition may be achieved by creating a mechanism that relies on ‘pride and fame’ rather 
than ‘fear and shame’. They suggest inviting Parties to voluntarily subject themselves to 
international review, replicating the approach of the voluntary national reviews under the UN 
High-Level Political Forum for Sustainable Development for evaluating progress towards the 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
However, a generic reporting and review process would duplicate the processes taking place 
under the Enhanced Transparency Framework. More targeted added value could be 
generated by inviting countries to provide case studies on success stories, which could then 
be highlighted in the GST and used to draw generally applicable lessons. This could include 
highlighting socio-economic costs and benefits of actions that have been taken and whether 
these costs and benefits were smaller or larger than initially expected (Constantino et al., 
2018). 
3.3.2. Transparency and Accountability for Mitigation Actions 
For mitigation, the first question is to what extent global emissions are on a pathway that is 
compatible with the Paris objectives, or not. What are the aggregated projected GHG 
emissions that result from all actions and when will emissions peak? And what is the 
projected increase in global average temperatures above pre-industrial levels based on 
current progress? Going down to the implementation level, the GST could also asses to what 
extent NDCs reflect the “highest possible ambition” as called for in the PA, given potential, 
costs and benefits (Höhne, Jeffery, Nilsson, & Fekete, 2019). 
Furthermore, if sectoral decarbonisation visions as suggested in the previous section were 
developed by the GST (or another process feeding into GST), these could be used to 
maximise the transparency function. That is, the GST could take stock not only of current 
and projected emission levels at global level, but it could also provide a disaggregated 
                                                        
1  In the past, for example the Multilateral Assessment Process under the Assessment and Review 
procedure for Annex I countries under the SBI (review process for Biennial Reports submitted by Annex I 
countries) has received rather little public engagement or attention and no higher-level event or measures to 
enhance publicity have been undertaken.  
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picture of the state and trends of decarbonisation at sector level, e.g. on the state and trends 
of zero-emission electricity sources or of energy efficiency. 
An ideal GST would also interrogate whether the NDCs are in line with equity and the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, whether 
countries are implementing domestic policies to meet their NDCs and whether these policies 
can be considered a major deviation from past activities (Höhne et al., 2019). However, such 
an assessment is not covered by the mandate to assess only collective progress. 
Nonetheless, as discussed above the GST process could provide an echo chamber for 
discussions in other arenas. If collective progress is on the political agenda at the global 
level, the natural next question at the national level would be to ask whether the respective 
country and the individual sectors within the country are doing enough. Such national 
questioning might be all the stronger if the GST signalled not only the lack of mitigation 
action but also the falling costs and non-climate benefits of mitigation options, as 
suggested in the preceding section. If the GST provided data and information on such 
points, this could aid national pro-compliance actors in the national discussions. 
From the equity perspective the assessment needs to bear in mind that contributions by 
developing countries are conditional on adequate provision of means of implementation by 
developed countries. The assessment of whether mitigation actions are adequate to achieve 
the PA objectives therefore also needs to take into account whether adequate levels of 
support are being provided (Holz et al., 2019). 
3.3.3. Transparency and Accountability for Adaptation Actions 
According to Article 7.14(c) of the PA, the GST shall ‘review the adequacy and effectiveness 
of adaptation and support provided for adaptation’. However, as discussed in the previous 
section, such a review is difficult as long as there is no guidance on what an adequate 
adaptation response would look like. 
Adaptation is different from mitigation in the sense that to a large extent costs and impacts 
are local and similarly the benefits of adaptation are local. Thus in terms of national 
adaptation actions governments are primarily responsible to their own populations - and 
thus the need for international transparency is decidedly different than for mitigation. The 
GST in turn is about taking stock of collective progress. 
However, as for mitigation the GST could take stock not only of collective, global level 
progress, it could also provide a disaggregated picture of the state and trends of adaptation 
and adaptation approaches at national and sector level and the approaches and 
methodologies used by countries to assess needs and progress. Enhanced transparency 
can play an important role in terms of furthering clarity of assumptions, approaches and 
metrics adopted at national level as well as the status and trends of efforts and results.  
From an equity perspective, an ideal GST would in this context also interrogate whether 
adaptation efforts are indeed focused on the most vulnerable (Holz et al., 2019). 
This would facilitate assessments at collective level under the GST, including whether the 
global needs for adaptation (governance/policy/legislation as well as finance and 
knowledge/capacity) are being met and if not, why? This stocktaking could include: 
• A qualitative assessment of the state of adaptation globally. What impacts are 
expected globally and regionally (by sector) and what has been done to adapt to such 
impacts? Seen over time such qualitative assessments could indicate a direction of 
change in the global situation. 
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• An economic (quantitative) assessment of adaptation costs, which can then be 
compared to financing provided to adaptation. 
In addition, the GST could provide an opportunity for Parties and stakeholders to share 
lessons learned and good practice. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in the 
subsequent section on knowledge and learning.  
3.3.4. Transparency and Accountability for Finance Actions 
The use of this function for finance is somewhat similar to that for mitigation in that it may 
be used as a lever to amplify the information from the transparency framework. In particular, 
the GST will speak to how much Parties are delivering (or not) with respect to the USD 100 
billion commitment – and to progress towards the subsequently agreed 2025 goal – and in 
what form it is being delivered. Such achievement (or lack thereof) of this commitment that 
the GST will formally reveal would be a key contribution to transparency and accountability 
that would in turn contribute towards building trust and faith in the UNFCCC around 
provision of climate finance. While the GST may formally only assess collective achievement 
of the finance goal, as discussed above the process may provide an echo chamber for 
discussions on whether individual countries are contributing their fair shares. 
Ideally, the GST should not only take stock of what finance is being delivered, but also take 
stock of the extent to which these flows correspond to the needs of finance for adaptation 
and mitigation. This is a question of overall effectiveness as well as a question of whether 
support is fairly distributed among recipient countries and sub-groups within these 
countries. However, currently data on needs is not consistent nor complete particularly at 
the collective level. A first attempt to articulate needs will be made in 2020 by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat – and mandated every two years after, which will inform the degree to which 
some assessment of needs and how they are being fulfilled can be made. Nonetheless, the 
GST could make a key contribution to improving the data situation by synthesising national 
assessments and independent assessments (Watson & Roberts, 2019). 
Taking stock of the consistency of global financial flows with the objectives of the Paris 
Agreement is even more difficult as there is no agreed definition on what consistency would 
entail. The transparency framework does not at present directly seek information on what 
Parties are doing to make financial flows consistent. Nonetheless, the GST could provide a 
first attempt at assessing collective progress building on efforts and related reporting by 
progressive countries. In this way, the GST could collectively report on flows that are not 
consistent, such as continued support of coal exploration, without shaming particular nation 
states (Watson & Roberts, 2019).  
3.4. Knowledge and Learning – How Do We Get Where We Need to Go? 
3.4.1. General Considerations 
The creation and diffusion of scientific, economic, technical and policy-related knowledge on 
the understanding of and/or possible solutions to the problem at hand is at the core of the 
GST’s mandate. The provision of transparency as discussed in the previous section in itself 
generates substantial knowledge and learning. This section discusses additional steps that 
could be taken to build on and further extend the knowledge generated by the transparency 
function. 
3.4.2. Knowledge and Learning for Mitigation 
On mitigation, a key item of knowledge is what kind of level of ambition is required in the 
upcoming NDC period, taking into account the achievements and shortfalls of the current 
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NDC period. Modelling studies have already explored the necessary increase in global 
ambition levels for 2030 and 2035 given the current NDCs and, along with further analyses, 
should inform the first GST (see for example Luderer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2016; 
Vandyck, Keramidas, Saveyn, Kitous, & Vrontisi, 2016). So while this information is not new, 
the GST could amplify its strength and officially make it the yardstick against which to 
assess the newly proposed NDCs. It is not within the mandate of the GST to assess 
individual NDCs, but as discussed in the previous section, it could provide the means for 
others – including national policymakers and civil society organizations – to carry out such 
work. 
As argued above, an ideal GST should also broaden its focus beyond consideration of 
emissions. Milkoreit and Haapala (2017, p. 2) have proposed to ‘use the GST as a peer-
learning platform for “how to do transformational change”’. This could be achieved if the 
GST were to identify synergies and transformative potentials to facilitate sustainable 
development in broader terms than just focussing on mitigation potentials. A process to 
develop sectoral decarbonisation visions as discussed for the guidance and signal function 
and tracking their implementation as discussed for the transparency function could be a key 
knowledge-building exercise towards this end. The GST could provide specific information 
addressing sectoral transformation challenges and providing information targeted to 
specific actors. The GST could for instance identify and showcase particularly ambitious 
NDCs or policies and measures taken to date drawing on the information collected as part of 
the transparency function. Ideally this should focus on those areas where common 
transformation challenges have been identified in previous work. While there are numerous 
studies on best practice policies and measures, within the UNFCCC process how to actually 
achieve emission reductions has so far not been discussed much. Showcasing and 
discussing ambitious policies and measures within the official GST process would therefore 
fill a gap in the current UNFCCC process and could help to raise the bar of what is commonly 
perceived as ‘the highest level of ambition’. Covering a diverse portfolio of countries at 
different stages of development and a wide range of specific national circumstances would 
help to account for the latter part of Art. 4.3, to take into account equity and national 
circumstances (Hermwille et al., 2019). The information drawn from Party reports could be 
complemented by other sources such as the IPCC special report on the 1.5°C goal, which 
outlines pathways to 1.5°C in the context of sustainable development in some detail.  
3.4.3. Knowledge and Learning for Adaptation 
On adaptation, the GST could foster learning on what climate-resilient development means 
and how it can be fostered. However, as discussed in the previous sections, the GST faces 
many unresolved methodolocial issues, including in particular: 
• Lack of agreed standardized metrics for measuring, aggregating and comparing 
adaptation results;  
• Lack of a standardized framework and methodology for how data should be 
collected and processed in national reporting; 
• Lacking definitions of key concepts such as 'adequacy' and 'effectiveness'.  
These issues are to some extent hindering learning (e.g. it is difficult to directly compare 
results or even if adaptation activities actually succeeded in achieving the intended 
impacts). On the other hand, the GST process can to some extent also inform those issues 
building on practical examples from countries or other entities. GST is thus an opportunity 
for compiling global lessons on: 
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• Which types of adaptation actions are being pursued in different sectors and 
different national contexts (environmental, socioeconomic etc.). This could 
essentially be a mapping exercise of what is actually being done on the ground (i.e. 
by definition considered potentially worthwhile adaptation activities). 
• Which adaptation actions are more effective in increasing resilience, reducing 
vulnerability and enhancing adaptive capacity. A true quantification of this would 
depend on agreed standardized metrics for comparison across sectors and national 
contexts. At this stage, qualitative assessment is possible to some extent. 
• What metrics have been applied to measure outcomes and impacts of adaptation in 
different sectors and national contexts, and what frameworks and methodologies 
have been applied to compile and aggregate data at the national level. Again, this 
would be an exercise to map examples and suggestions that can inform the global 
discourse and help to develop standardized approaches. 
3.4.4. Knowledge and Learning for Finance 
On finance, major parts of the contribution the GST could make to knowledge and learning 
have already been discussed in the previous section as generation of new knowledge and 
learning is a precondition for implementing the transparency function: tracking the extent to 
which financial flows are being shifted and whether there is an appropriate balance between 
adaptation  and mitigation in climate finance requires developing a sense of what 
‘consistency with Paris’ and ‘balance between adaptation and mitigation’ should mean.  
In addition, the GST could amplify the shared understanding and learning on climate finance 
that has been achieved since 2014 through the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance’s 
Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows (BA). Decision 19/CMA.1 
(Matters relating to Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 99–101 of decision 
1/CP.21), paragraph 36(d) states that the GST will “include information from the latest 
biennial assessment and overview of climate finance flows of the Standing Committee on 
Finance.” The BA, while focussed on reviewing methods to track climate finance and 
estimating both global climate finance as well as the provision from developed to 
developing countries, has worked to normalise climate finance concepts and most recently 
(in 2018) included discussion of Article 2.1(c) through discussion of methods, data and 
matters relevant to establishing consistency of financial flows with the PA (Watson & 
Roberts, 2019). 
The BA is unlikely to be, however, an explicit guide to what is consistent and what is not 
consistent with the PA. This is both due to the nature of the political process that produces 
the BA as well as the its historical more backward looking nature. The GST could take a 
more forward-looking perspective and host discussions on what consistency could mean 
and by which policies and institutions it could be achieved. The objective for an ideal GST 
would be to develop specific guidance. However, this is unlikely to be achieved given the 
strong political ramifications of this issue (Watson & Roberts, 2019). Nonetheless, even just 
hosting discussions and digging into details of different approaches used by Parties and 
financial actors would contribute to policy learning.  
Given the contentious nature of the issue, it can be assumed that implementation of Article 
2.1 (c) will mostly take place outside the UNFCCC. To make sure to capture the breadth of 
discussions and activities that are taking place globally, the GST could specifically invite 
input from relevant actors, such as the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures.  
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+ 4. Operationalizing the Functions 
 
Whether or not the GST will be able to fulfil its functions will depend on how it is designed. 
This section discusses which process- and information-related conditions are needed to 
achieve the potential impacts discussed in the previous chapter. It also considers the extent 
to which the adopted modalities of the GST meet those conditions. This chapter is strongly 
derived from Hermwille et al. (2019). 
4.1. Information-related Conditions for an Ideal Global Stocktake  
The GST process first of all needs to be provided with the information that is needed to 
answer the questions of ‘Where are we now?’, ‘Where do we need to go?’, and ‘How do we 
get there?’. In the following we discuss what kind of information inputs would be necessary 
to answer these questions.  
4.1.1. Setting Benchmarks 
As discussed in chapter 3, the answer to the question ‘Where do we need to go?’ needs to be 
spelled out much more specifically than has been done so far for each of the topics 
mitigation, adaptation and finance. Chapter 3 suggested that ‘S.M.A.R.T’ objectives should 
be developed for each of the topics mitigation, adaptation and finance. These objectives 
could then be used as benchmarks to measure to what extent the global community is 
making progress.  
The GST process would therefore need inputs on how to define and operationalize 
measurable benchmarks for the various objectives of the Paris Agreement. Chapter 3 
discussed in particular the following items: 
• Benchmarks for the global mitigation progress required to meet the well below 2°C or 
1.5°C target – what kind and level of action is required in what timeframe? To 
elaborate on this point the GST needs to take into account the best available climate 
science, in particular the IPCC. 
• Sectoral emission pathways and other indicators of decarbonisation such as the rate 
of energy efficiency improvements or the relative shares of high-emission and low-
emission energy sources, as well as other dimensions of sustainability. The IPCC 
plays a crucial role in this regard as well as it is the globally most prominent and 
legitimate institution synthesising and providing such information. Target values for 
such benchmarks would need to differentiated at regional or national level to reflect 
national circumstances so that they are both relevant and take into account equity 
considerations as different countries will require different timeframes to implement 
the transition. 
• On finance, the USD 100 billion mobilization objective and the subsequent objective 
that is to be agreed by 2025 constitute a collective benchmark. The GST could 
contribute to the development of the 2025 objective by analysing what levels of 
support developing countries actually require. 
• An ideal GST could also set benchmarks for equity in the sense of fair country shares 
in the global mitigation effort and in the effort to achieve the USD 100 billion 
mobilization goal and future finance goals. However, as the mandate of the GST is to 
consider collective progress, such a suggestion would probably not be accepted 
politically. 
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• Benchmarks on how to establish a balance between adaption and mitigation finance 
in international provision, considering the pros and cons of definitions and 
approaches that are currently being used.  
• Benchmark for key areas of consistency of all financial flows, such as financial policy 
and regulation, fiscal policy and public finance. Similar to mitigation benchmarks, this 
would have to take into account country circumstances affecting the speed at which 
countries could implement the finance transition.  
• For adaptation, as discussed it is difficult to define globally applicable benchmarks 
of success. However, benchmarks for reporting on adaptation would facilitate 
assessments of collective progress. This could be in the form of minimum standards 
for e.g. coverage of sectors, timelines, transparency of reporting methods, 
approaches for cost assessments, etc.  
• Benchmarks for adaptation could also relate to provision of information on the 
existence of governance structures, legislation and policies. 
4.1.2. Transparent, High-Quality Reporting on Current Efforts and Lessons Learned 
The GST will require comprehensive and high-quality information to be able to answer the 
question “Where are we now?”. This information should ideally be organised according to 
progress benchmarks as suggested in the previous section. 
On mitigation, information sources need to be able to clearly quantify the emission levels 
that will result from Parties’ NDCs. Parties’ GHG inventories are the main information source 
for this question. The information needs to be transparent, accurate, complete, consistent, 
and comparable (TACCC principles, see IPCC, 2006). The PA explicitly refers to this standard 
by requiring Parties to “promote environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, 
completeness, comparability and consistency, and ensure the avoidance of double 
counting…” (UNFCCC, 2016b, Art. 14.3). However, the diversity of the NDCs is a challenge 
and creates the need for differentiated information requirements for different types of NDCs 
(for a discussion of information requirements for NDCs see Briner & Moarif, 2016; Schneider 
et al., 2017; Herold, Siemons, & Herrmann, 2018). 
On finance, stringency and transparency of reporting would need to be significantly 
improved. Currently, there is not even a clear agreement on what counts as climate finance. 
For example, while some Parties account only the grant equivalent of loans towards their 
finance pledges, other Parties account the full loan volume. Nor is there agreement on what 
consistency of financial flows should mean, as discussed in chapter 3.  
On adaptation, there similarly is no agreement on what metrics to apply to measure 
outcomes and impacts of adaptation in different sectors and national contexts, and what 
frameworks and methodologies to apply to compile and aggregate data at the national level.  
The GST or other processes under the UNFCCC could contribute to the development of 
standardised metrics by maping examples and suggestions that can inform the global 
discourse and help to develop standardized approaches. 
In addition to figures on emissions, finance and possibly other quantifiable indicators of 
progress, Parties should also share information on the actions they have taken and lessons 
they have learned in order to facilitate policy learning. What are priorities and visions 
towards a low-carbon and climate-resilient economy? What are the perceived key 
Success Factors for the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement December 2019 
 
iGST Designing a Robust Stocktake Discussion Series 26 
 
challenges/barriers for progress and what strategies are in place to address them? And how 
could progress be assessed (Hermwille et al., 2019)? 
4.1.3. Political relevance 
Lastly, an ideal GST requires information that is able to inform national policy-making and to 
trigger national enhancement of ambition. The GST needs to provide guidance and 
orientation to countries. This can best be achieved by showcasing solution-oriented 
outcomes, opportunities and best practices, instead of focusing on gaps in action alone. The 
following conditions can help to strengthen the political relevance of the GST and its 
outcome at the national level (Hermwille et al., 2019): 
• Information used stems from a source with credibility/legitimacy; 
• Sector-specific information regarding challenges and opportunities is shared from 
country’s own perspective and synthesised in global/aggregate reports; 
• Good practice examples can be identified (e.g. in a format similar to the TEPs – see 
further below); 
• Multiple benefits between mitigation and adaptation actions, as well as with respect 
to other dimensions of sustainable development are identified; 
• All of the above information is reflective of the differences in national contexts and 
circumstances for which recommendations are being developed. That is, the GST 
should not promote a ‘one size fits all’ solution but a portfolio of options that are 
suitable for different circumstances and are provided from multiple sources (and 
voices). 
4.2. Process-related Preconditions 
4.2.1. Overall Considerations 
The GST needs to be understood as a process rather than an event or a specific outcome 
(also see Milkoreit & Haapala, 2018). One key point of the GST is to help create a political 
moment where policy makers are put under scrutiny regarding their level of ambition (or lack 
thereof). Sending signals and contributing to accountability and policy learning will take time 
to be effective. 
The modalities of the GST agreed in Katowice do provide for an in-depth process. They 
foresee three phases: information collection and preparation, technical assessment and a 
political phase of the “consideration of outputs” (UNFCCC, 2018a). The GST will commence 
1.5 – 2 years (depending on the timing of the publication of the 6th Assessment Report of the 
IPCC) before the final consideration of outputs that will take place during COP29 in 2023. In 
this section we will derive key process-related preconditions for the three phases. 
A fundamental precondition for all components of the GST is procedural equity. Parties 
already agreed in Katowice that the three thematic areas of the GST should be addressed in 
a balanced manner, including via by balanced time allocations. The GST process should 
provide equitable access for different groups of stakeholders, as well as the equitable 
treatment of their respective inputs and perspectives. This should include not only 
facilitating participation of developing country government delegations, but also 
participation of non-governmental stakeholders. Stakeholders from developing countries will 
also require support to effectively engage by producing inputs. Otherwise, the GST will 
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repeat the experience of the Talanoa Dialogue, where inputs were heavily dominated by 
developed country research and civil society organisations (Holz et al., 2019). 
4.2.2. Information Collection and Technical Assessment 
The first step of the GST as a process is to gather and process relevant data and 
information, particularly information provided from the transparency framework. This step is 
particularly relevant for the transparency and accountability function as well as for the 
knowledge and learning function. A challenge here is that the information provided by 
Parties through the transparency framework may be incomplete or biased. To maximise the 
transparency and accountability function, there should therefore ideally be an opportunity for 
stakeholders to comment on and complement these inputs, particularly the transparency 
reports and communications from parties.  
The modalities adopted in Katowice are somewhat worrying in this respect: the decision 
specifies that the inputs will be made “fully accessible by Parties“ (UNFCCC, 2018a, para. 10 
and 21, emphasis added). While this does not explicitly exclude that the inputs will be 
publicly available, the phrase caused some concern among observers that the GST could 
end up being a rather secretive endeavour. The help maximise the quality of the inputs from 
Parties, they should be available to stakeholders and the GST should be open to inputs from 
stakeholders with at least two rounds, a first round for initial input in parallel to the reception 
of input from the transparency framework, and a second round to provide the opportunity to 
comment on and complement the inputs received in the first round. 
The process could further be facilitated by a technical synthesis report by the Secretariat 
that systematically collates the results of the technical expert reviews that are undertaken 
under the Enhanced Transparency Framework. It may also include the deficits and proposed 
“areas of improvement” identified in the expert review process as well as insights from the 
facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress which is supposed to conclude the review 
process (UNFCCC, 2016b, Art. 13.11-12). The modalities of the GST as adopted in Katowice 
provide such a mandate. In fact, they request the Secretariat to prepare four synthesis 
reports on the state of emissions, the progress of NDC implementation, the state of 
adaptation efforts, and the state of financial flows. 
As discussed above, singling out individual countries will not be possible under the GST. One 
option to overcome this limitation could be do derive assessments for anonymised groups 
of Parties in the synthesis reports. For example, the reports could include statements like ‘X 
countries representing Y per cent of global emissions show significant implementation 
deficits and are unlikely to meet their targets unless implementation is improved.’ The report 
could be the basis of discussions and serve as a means to hold countries accountable. It 
would be accessible to various stakeholders and could be leveraged to create political 
pressure on the national level. How these reports will be considered in the technical 
assessment is however not currently specified in the modalities for the GST (Hermwille et 
al., 2019). 
Complementary to this suggested public appraisal of inputs, a more facilitative and issue 
specific workstream would be required to enable information sharing and ‘transformational 
learning‘ (Milkoreit & Haapala, 2017). The GST modalities structure its work according to 
three “thematic areas” – mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation and support. 
Notably and after substantial controversy, Parties agreed to open the process to also 
consider loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. On each 
of these themes, technical dialogues will be held by means of “in-session round tables, 
workshops or other activities” (UNFCCC, 2018a, para. 6).  
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This creates ample leeway for the Chairs and co-facilitators to provide a meaningful 
structure for the technical assessment. Ideally, this would take the form of structured 
dialogues of experts, which should focus on concrete transformation challenges for 
adaptation, mitigation and finance in order to fully exploit the potential of these dialogues. 
Input from non-state and subnational initiatives could be particularly valuable here and the 
modalities of the GST enable this stakeholder engagement. Non-party stakeholder 
participation was one of the more contentious issues in Katowice. But, ultimately, Parties 
decided that the GST will be “conducted in a transparent manner and with the participation 
of non-Party stakeholders” (UNFCCC, 2018a, para. 6). Opportunities for participation include 
provision of written submissions as input to the GST and engagement in the technical 
dialogues outlined above.  
How could these technical dialogues be structured? Milkoreit & Haapala (2018) suggest that 
the first periodic review (2013-2015) of the adequacy of, and overall progress toward, 
achieving the long-term global goal could serve as a valuable precedent, in particular the 
Structured Expert Dialogue that was conducted under this review. Alternatively, the 
dialogues could be modelled, for example, after the existing Technical Examination 
Processes (TEPs) held under the joint auspices of the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Bodies for the 
topics of mitigation and adaptation, or the Technical and Economic Assessment Panel 
(TEAP) under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Hermwille, 
2018). The latter has been particularly successful in translating technical work at the expert 
level into a gradual increase of ambition at the political level (Andersen and Sarma 2002; 
Gonzalez et al. 2015). Finally, the Talanoa Dialogue that concluded at COP24 in Katowice 
was seen as a precedent for the GST. It solicited a large amount of input from all kinds of 
stakeholders. The process produced a synthesis report of all the inputs received and 
discussions held over the course of the year (UNFCCC, 2018c) and resulted in the ‘Talanoa 
Call for Action’ (UNFCCC, 2018b). However, that call did not trigger immediate political 
response in terms of more ambitious targets. Within the negotiations it lacked a high profile 
and given these limitations it seems doubtful whether it can effectively stimulate further 
action (Obergassel et al., 2019).  
To ensure engagement and support of all Parties, the technical dialogues will need to 
consider equity issues, both in their design and in the content considered. In terms of 
process, the dialogues should be scheduled in a manner that is inclusive, accessible, and 
manageable to all Parties, and broad in the scope of issues considered. At the same time, 
the technical assessment should also more directly address equity and the extent to which 
Parties, or groups of Parties, are falling short on their equitable contributions. A key 
challenge here is that equity issues are inherently differentiated, relating to the adequacy of 
individual efforts, which clashes with the mandate of the GST to assess collective progress. 
The aforementioned approach of deriving assessments for anonymised groups of countries 
could be used with a focus on metrics of a more equitable world, such as access to energy, 
shifts in per capita emissions, or the ability of Parties and non-Party actors to access 
finance. Alternatively, one could explore assessing equity by grouping countries according to 
NDC type or socioeconomic circumstances and developing benchmarks for what level of 
effort each group should make from an equity perspective (Hermwille et al., 2019). 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the GST should also take into account, and relate 
itself to, other relevant international agendas endorsing sectoral transformation pathways, 
particularly the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development with its Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) as well as UN Habitat’s New Urban Agenda. The goals of any single Agenda 
can only be achieved in accordance with the other Agendas (Wolfgang Obergassel, 
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Mersmann, & Wang-Helmreich, 2017; von Stechow et al., 2016). The modalities of the GST 
provide at least one inroad to do so: “Relevant reports from United Nations agencies and 
other international organizations, that should be supportive of the UNFCCC process” are 
explicitly listed as one of the information sources to be considered (UNFCCC, 2018a, para. 
37f) 
Finally, a key procedural requirement for the technical phase of the GST is adequate timing. 
The inputs from the Enhanced Transparency Framework, such as the data and information 
from the technical reviews, need to be prepared and published at an appropriate time. 
Likewise, the results of the technical phase need to duly feed into the political phase of the 
GST and the political phase must be concluded in a timely manner to have an effect on 
national political agendas regarding the development of subsequent NDCs. At least for the 
first GST, this requirement will not be met. The provisions of the Enhanced Transparency 
Framework will only be applied as of 2024 (Obergassel et al., 2019). The first GST, therefore, 
will have to rely on the more limited information provided in the more limited previous 
transparency framework, namely National Communications, Biennial Reports and Biennial 
Update Reports, as well as other inputs, such as the NDCs themselves, adaptation 
communications, national adaptation plans, reports from the bodies under the UNFCCC, 
IPCC reports, and others. For subsequent GSTs the inputs from the Enhanced Transparency 
Framework will be available sufficiently in advance to be used in the GST (Hermwille et al., 
2019). 
4.2.3. Political phase: Consideration of Outputs 
The GST concludes with the political phase of the final consideration of outputs that will 
take place during COP29 in 2023. The political phase is relevant for all three functions 
discussed in this paper. The messages emanating from the GST process must be strong 
enough to effectively stimulate national and subnational governance levels. The political 
weight of the suggested “public appraisal of inputs” could be maximised if Parties formally 
‘acknowledged‘ or ‘took note of‘ corresponding reports and stakeholder comments through a 
high-level endorsement as part of the political phase. This could help generate the level of 
public attention required to impact on national political agendas. The modalities adopted in 
Katowice foresee high-level events for the conclusion of the GST, which would identify good 
practices and opportunities for enhancing action. The modalities also state that the events 
could provide a summary of key political messages and recommendations. However, they 
leave open the question of whether these events would result in a formal CMA decision or a 
political declaration with a lesser legal footing (UNFCCC, 2018a, para. 34). 
Finally, the political phase of the GST needs to include a renewed political signal. Parties 
need to reaffirm that they still honour the PA and its goals and demonstrate their continued 
resolve to act upon them. Doing so will not only raise the stakes in terms of the reputational 
repercussions of non-compliance at the international level (Simmons, 1998). It will also 
enable stakeholders to hold their respective governments accountable at the national level, 
in the event that they do not fully implement or achieve their NDC. Periodically expressing 
collective commitment to the Paris Agreement may help to maintain support for it, and make 
it more costly for policymakers to (silently2) abandon climate ambition (Hermwille et al., 
2019).  
To achieve these outcomes, the final outputs of the GST process should include: 
                                                        
2  Since achieving NDC targets is not legally binding, Parties do not need to formally withdraw if they no 
longer wish to implement those targets. Instead, they may simply disregard the Paris Agreement, at least until the 
next NDC cycle. 
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• High-level political messages on the need to enhance efforts contained in a summary 
report by the GST co-chairs; 
• A detailed technical summary of available options, best practice, and 
recommendations (Northrop et al., 2018). 
To give the most possible legal and political weight to the outcome, the final output of the 
process should be a CMA decision 
• re-affirming Parties commitment to achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement; 
• urging Parties to urgently strengthen their efforts in all areas of adaptation, 
mitigation and finance; 
• fully endorsing the high-level political messages and detailed recommendations 
emanating from the GST; 
• urging Parties to fully take the results of the GST into account in the revision of their 
NDCs. 
The decision could also request the IPCC and the subsidiary bodies to undertake further 
work to help inform the next GST, in particular on knowledge gaps that have been identified 
(Northrop et al., 2018).  
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+ 5. Conclusion 
	
What makes an ideal GST? An ideal GST is one that facilitates transformational change. In 
this report we have outlined three distinct functions of the GST addressing different 
mechanisms of driving change. We believe that all three of these functions need to be 
exploited to maximise the catalytic effect of the GST.  
For each of the functions, we have identified a number of key conditions for the GST to fully 
exploit its potential as a motor of transformation. Table 1, below, summarizes the findings.  
Function of the 
Global 
Stocktake 





Reinforcement of the 
collective goals agreed 
in Paris 
Political endorsement of IPCC 
reports, restatement of commitment 
(“creed”) to collective targets  
Emphasis that current action on 
mitigation, adaptation and finance 
is insufficient 
Best available science defining and 
adapting collective goals and 
pathways to reach them 
Further development 





Processing and endorsement of 
sectoral transformation pathways 
and benchmarks 
Consistency with other 
international Agendas (SDGs, New 
Urban Agenda) 
Processing and endorsement of 
suggestions what ‘Paris-consistent 
financial flows’ and ‘balance 
between adaptation and mitigation’ 
could mean. 
Providing a forum for exchange 
including stakeholders such as 
transnational governance initiatives 
(e.g. GCA) 
Information on sector-specific 
transformation challenges and 
benchmarks (input through best 
available science, TEPs…) 
Best available science on current 
and projected climate impacts 
Input on definitions of consistency 
of financial flows and balance of 
finance between adaptation and 
mitigation and data to 
operationalise these definitions 




Timing of Global Stocktake: needs 
to happen with sufficient time 
ahead of setting the next NDCs 
Outputs need to align with national 
discourses 





Need high-level endorsement as 
well as public attention during the 
political phase of the Global 
Stocktake 
Outputs should contain a concise 






Availability of accurate and 
sufficiently granular data  
Adequate timing of transparency 
reports 
Public appraisal of (national) inputs 
e.g. in form of synthesis report of 
national technical reports under 
Art. 13 by Secretariat 
Transparency of NDCs  
Meaningful information needs to be 
included in transparency reports 
TACCC principles: transparency, 
accuracy, completeness, 
consistency, comparability of data 
and information submitted by 
countries 
Public attention on Public consultation round on inputs Summary of national inputs, e.g. in 
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to Global Stocktake form of synthesis report including:  
summary of reaching progress for 
each country in context of available 
means of implementation 
recommendations for closing 





learning among Parties 
and other actors, as 
well as highlighting 
positive developments 
and synergetic 
opportunities as well as 
trade-offs to be avoided 
“Workstream” that enables 
information sharing at sectoral 
level 
Decision on thematic focus areas 
for sharing lessons learnt 
Showcasing of best practice 
examples 
Best available science on 
decarbonisation pathways, 
transformation strategies, 
consistency of financial flows… 
Information on best practice 
regarding implementation 
Solution-oriented outcomes instead 
of focus on insufficiency of action 
Table 1: Synthesis of preconditions for an ideal Global Stocktake (adapted from Hermwille et al., 
2019). 
Essentially, to be effective, the GST needs to be designed as a process, not an isolated event, 
and this process needs to meet certain conditions : 
• The process needs to be inclusive, facilitating participation by a broad range of 
stakeholders, in particular from developing countries. Facilitating participation 
should include not only participation at GST events, but also support for active 
engagement, such as providing written inputs to the GST.  
• Information provided by Parties and complemented with other inputs needs to 
enable benchmark setting for climate action, to allow for transparent assessments 
of the state of progress, and to be politically relevant and concrete enough to trigger 
enhancement of action. 
• The process needs to be scheduled in a timely manner, so that the informational 
input is ready when needed and the political output comes in time to be most 
effective. 
• The process needs to give stakeholders opportunities to comment on and 
complement the information provided by Parties as this information may be 
incomplete or biased. 
• Complementarily, the GST requires a facilitative format in which good practice can 
be shared, highlighted and processed into relevant recommendations. Ideally, this 
would take the form of structured dialogues of experts focusing on concrete 
challenges for adaptation, mitigation and finance and how to overcome them.  
• Outputs should include high-level political messages on the need to enhance efforts 
as well as a detailed technical summary of available options, best practice, and 
recommendations. The final output should be a CMA decision fully endorsing the 
results of the GST and urging Parties to take them fully into account in the revision of 
their NDCs. 
• Finally, the GST needs to feature a high-level political event in order to amplify the 
messages towards influencing national policy agendas and as a renewed political 
commitment that Parties still honour the PA and its goals. 
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An ideal GST could arguably best fulfil its functions if it was able to address not only the 
collective level of effort but also the efforts of individual Parties. However, the mandate of 
the GST is to assess only collective progress. This limitation may be overcome to some 
extent by assessing groups of countries. For example, Parties could be grouped into tiers 
according to indicators of responsibility and capability such as current and historic per 
capita emissions or GDP. In addition, the overall GST process may serve as ‘echo chamber’ 
for broader discussions on the efforts of individual Parties.  
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